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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents the purely legal question of whether 
a disparity between disability benefits for mental and 
physical disabilities violates the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et  seq. (1994). The 
plaintiff-appellant, Colleen Ford, sued her employer, 
Schering-Plough Corporation (Schering), and the carrier of 
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Schering's group insurance policy, Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company (MetLife), alleging that the two-year 
cap applicable to benefits for mental disabilities, but not for 
physical disabilities, violates the ADA. On September 12, 
1996, the District Court for the District of New Jersey 
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Ford's complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Ford 
appealed. We will affirm the order of the district court 
dismissing Ford's complaint even though we differ with the 
district court by finding Ford eligible to file suit under Title 




The facts concerning the plaintiff's employment and her 
disability are not in dispute. Ford was an employee of 
Schering from 1975 until May of 1992, when she became 
disabled by virtue of a mental disorder and was unable to 
continue her employment. While she served as an 
employee, Ford enrolled in the employee welfare benefits 
plan offered by Schering through MetLife. The plan 
provided that benefits for physical disabilities would 
continue until the disabled employee reached age sixty-five 
so long as the physical disability persisted. Regarding 
mental disabilities, however, the plan mandated that 
benefits cease after two years if the disabled employee was 
not hospitalized. Ford found herself in this latter category, 
suffering from a mental disorder yet not hospitalized and 
thus ineligible for a continuation of her benefits past the 
two-year limit. Her benefits expired on Nov. 23, 1994. 
 
Ford filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC 
issued her a "right-to-sue" letter on January 31, 1996. 
Subsequently, Ford filed a three-count complaint against 
Schering and MetLife alleging discrimination in violation of 
the ADA. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the 
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and, in the alternative, 
for summary judgment. The district court granted the 
defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the complaint 
for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed. 
 




We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 (1994), and 
our review over the district court's order is plenary. When 
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept as true all the 
allegations set forth in the complaint, and we must draw all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Schrob v. 
Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991). Dismissal of 
a plaintiff's claim under Rule 12(b)(6) occurs only if the 
plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 




Because the facts of this case are not in dispute, our 
analysis focuses on the legal question of whether the 
disparity between mental and physical disability benefits 
violates the ADA and, as a preliminary issue, whether Ford 
is even eligible to sue under the ADA. We will address 




Ford's first claim alleges that the defendants' group 
insurance plan violates Title I of the ADA because of the 
disparity in benefits between mental and physical 
disabilities. Title I of the ADA proscribes discrimination in 
the terms and conditions of employment and mandates in 
relevant part: 
 
       (a) General rule 
 
       No covered entity shall discriminate against a 
       qualified individual with a disability because of the 
       disability of such individual in regard to job application 
       procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
       employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
       other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 
 
       (b) Construction 
 
       As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term 
       "discriminate" includes-- 
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       . . . . 
 
       (2) participating in a contractual or other 
       arrangement or relationship that has the effect of 
       subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or 
       employee with a disability to the discrimination 
       prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship 
       includes a relationship with . . . an organization 
       providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered 
       entity[)] . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12112(a)-(b) (emphasis added). As the plaintiff 
correctly observes, the defendants' group insurance plan is 
a fringe benefit of employment at Schering. Ford claims 
that the defendants violated Title I of the ADA because the 
mental-physical disparity constitutes discrimination against 




Before addressing the merits of Ford's Title I claim, we 
must first ascertain whether Ford is eligible tofile suit 
under Title I. While the district court held that Ford lacked 
"standing[,]" Dist. Ct. Op. at 7, the question of standing is 
not at issue in this case. Indeed, Ford has been"injured in 
fact" by the denial of her benefits, which is"an injury to 
[herself] that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 
U.S. 26, 38, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1924 (1976). Furthermore, 
Ford's interest is arguably within the zone of interests 
regulated by the ADA. See id. at 39 n.19, 96 S. Ct. at 1925 
n.19. Instead of ascertaining Ford's standing, we must 
assess Ford's eligibility under the ADA's requirements to file 
suit. 
 
Title I of the ADA restricts the ability to sue under its 
provisions to a "qualified individual with a disability[,]" 
whose characteristics are defined as follows: 
 
       The term "qualified individual with a disability" 
       means an individual with a disability who, with or 
       without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
       essential functions of the employment position that 
       such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of 
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       this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the 
       employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are 
       essential, and if an employer has prepared a written 
       description before advertising or interviewing applicants 
       for the job, this description shall be considered 
       evidence of the essential functions of the job. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12111(8). Thus, an individual eligible to sue 
under Title I of the ADA must be disabled but still able to 
perform his or her job duties with or without a reasonable 
accommodation by the employer. Ford, however, admits 
that she is currently unable to work even with a reasonable 
accommodation. Indeed, her disabled status is the reason 
for her desire to receive the disability benefits at issue here. 
 
The defendants-appellees argue that Ford is clearly 
ineligible to sue under Title I of the ADA because she is 
currently disabled, and they point to our recent statement 
that "a person unable to work is not intended to be, and is 
not, covered by the ADA." McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 
F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 
S. Ct. 958 (1997). McNemar focused on whether an 
individual is judicially estopped from claiming to be a 
"qualified individual with a disability" when he represented 
to governmental agencies that he was completely disabled. 
In McNemar, an HIV-positive man represented to 
government agencies that he was completely disabled for 
the purpose of receiving disability benefits. At the same 
time, he asserted that he was a "qualified individual with a 
disability[,]" meaning that he could work with or without a 
reasonable accommodation, in his suit against his former 
employer under the ADA for wrongful discharge. As a 
result, we concluded that the district court was within its 
discretion in finding that McNemar's representations to 
government agencies estopped him from claiming that he 
was a "qualified individual with a disability" under Title I. 
See id. at 617-18. 
 
At first glance, McNemar seems to cover the instant case 
since Ford has asserted she is completely disabled for 
purposes of disability benefits yet is now asserting she is a 
"qualified individual with a disability" for purposes of her 
ADA suit. However, despite its apparent relevance, 
McNemar is distinguishable. In McNemar, the plaintiff's 
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situation vis-a-vis the ADA did not give rise to the 
possibility that, for reasons intrinsic to the ADA, there was 
an ambiguity in the definition of "qualified individual with 
a disability[.]" The essence of McNemar's suit was that he 
could still work despite his disability (meaning that he was 
wrongfully discharged), yet he simultaneously received 
benefits for being unable to work due to his disability. 
McNemar's situation did not unearth an internal 
contradiction in the ADA; instead, the contradiction in 
McNemar's position arose between McNemar's various 
representations, namely his claim of wrongful discharge 
and his assertion to government agencies that he was 
completely disabled. 
 
In the instant case, Ford is also attempting to qualify 
under Title I's eligibility requirement, but the factual 
predicate of her claim (that she is disabled and deserving of 
disability benefits) matches the representation she made to 
qualify for the benefits she already received. Unlike the 
McNemar plaintiff, Ford illuminates an internal 
contradiction in the ADA itself, namely the disjunction 
between the ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a 
disability" and the rights that the ADA confers. Title I of the 
ADA prohibits discrimination by employers regarding the 
"terms, conditions, and privileges" of employment, 42 
U.S.C. S 12112(a), including "fringe benefits" such as 
disability benefits. Id. S 12112(b)(2). Yet, as Ford and the 
EEOC as amicus argue, restricting eligibility to sue under 
Title I to individuals who can currently work with or without 
a reasonable accommodation prevents disabled former 
employees from suing regarding discrimination in disability 
benefits. Once an individual becomes disabled and thus 
eligible for disability benefits, that individual loses the 
ability to sue under a strict reading of Title I's definition of 
"qualified individual with a disability" because that 
individual can no longer work with or without a reasonable 
accommodation. In order for the rights guaranteed by Title 
I to be fully effectuated, the definition of "qualified 
individual with a disability" would have to permit suits 
under Title I by more than just individuals who are 
currently able to work with or without reasonable 
accommodations. 
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This disjunction between the explicit rights created by 
Title I of the ADA and the ostensible eligibility standards for 
filing suit under Title I causes us to view the contents of 
those requirements as ambiguous rather than as having an 
unassailable plain meaning. "The plainness or ambiguity of 
statutory language is determined by reference to the 
language itself, the specific context in which that language 
is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S. Ct. 843, 
846 (1997) (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 
505 U.S. 469, 477, 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594-95 (1992), and 
McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139, 111 S. Ct. 1737, 
1740 (1991)). The locus of the ambiguity is whether the 
ADA contains a temporal qualifier of the term "qualified 
individual with a disability[.]" If the putative plaintiff must, 
at the time of the suit, be employable with or without a 
reasonable accommodation, then a disabled former 
employee loses his ability to sue to challenge discriminatory 
disability benefits. Alternatively, the term "qualified 
individual with a disability" may include former employees 
who were once employed with or without reasonable 
accommodations yet who, at the time of suit, are completely 
disabled. 
 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Robinson, which 
concerned the scope of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq. (1994), contributes to this 
ambiguity by lending support for interpreting Title I of the 
ADA to permit suits by disabled individuals against their 
former employers concerning their disability benefits. Cases 
interpreting Title VII are relevant to our analysis of the ADA 
because the ADA is essentially a sibling statute of Title VII. 
Indeed, the ADA's accompanying House report states that 
the purpose of the ADA is "to provide civil rights protections 
for persons with disabilities that are parallel to those 
available to minorities and women." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, 
pt. 3, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 471. 
Furthermore, the ADA incorporates by reference several 
terms defined in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. S 12111(7) 
(incorporating Title VII's definitions of "person", "labor 
organization", etc.). 
 
In Robinson, the Supreme Court analyzed whether former 
employees are allowed to bring suits against their previous 
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employers under Title VII for post-termination retaliation 
such as negative job references. The Court found that the 
term "employees" as used in S 704(a) of Title VII was 
ambiguous regarding its temporal reach, i.e., whether it 
covered only current employees or encompassed former 
employees as well. See ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S. Ct. at 846- 
48. Resolving this ambiguity, the Court held that the term 
encompassed former employees in order to provide former 
employees with a legal recourse against post-termination 
retaliation. See id. at ___, 117 S. Ct. at 848-49; see 
also Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 200 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (former employee may file a retaliation claim 
against a former employer under Title VII). 
 
As with the term "employees" in Title VII, the ADA 
contains an ambiguity concerning the definition of 
"qualified individual with a disability" because there is no 
temporal qualifier for that definition. Congress could have 
restricted the eligibility for plaintiffs under the ADA to 
current employees or could have explicitly broadened the 
eligibility to include former employees. Since Congress did 
neither but still created rights regarding disability benefits, 
we are left with an ambiguity in the text of the statute 
regarding eligibility to sue under Title I. 
 
We resolve this ambiguity by interpreting Title I of the 
ADA to allow disabled former employees to sue their former 
employers regarding their disability benefits so as to 
effectuate the full panoply of rights guaranteed by the ADA. 
This is in keeping with the ADA's rationale, namely "to 
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities . . . [and] to provide clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing [such] discrimination 
. . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 12101(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). Our 
decision is also in keeping with the Supreme Court's 
Robinson decision, which found that the temporal reach of 
Title VII encompasses former employees, and our pre- 
Robinson decision to that effect in Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200. 
 
By adopting this interpretation, we part ways with the 
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, both of which tendered 
decisions prior to Robinson.1 In EEOC v. CNA Ins. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Sixth Circuit in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181 
(6th Cir. 1996), analyzed whether a plaintiff was eligible to sue under 
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Companies, 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh 
Circuit rejected the suit of an individual in a position 
similar to Ford's. Litigating on behalf of the former 
employee, the EEOC argued that the individual was eligible 
to sue under Title I by arguing that an analogy may be 
drawn to decisions allowing former employees to sue 
employers for retaliation under Title VII. The Seventh 
Circuit rejected this argument by noting that no 
discrimination against the plaintiff occurred during her 
employment, while, in the Title VII retaliation situation, 
actual harm occurred by virtue of the retaliation. As the 
Seventh Circuit wrote, "[N]othing happened that 
discriminated against her during the time she was working 
at CNA. The only thing that occurred was CNA's 1985 
decision to reduce the long-term benefits available to all of 
its employees for mental health problems." Id. at 1045. 
However, the Seventh Circuit's brief analysis conflates two 
issues, the first being whether the individual could sue 
regarding fringe benefits while completely disabled, and the 
second being whether the individual's suit had merit and 
was based upon actual discrimination. The Seventh Circuit 
essentially declined to find the individual eligible to sue 
because her suit lacked merit. Therefore, we do notfind the 
Seventh Circuit's reasoning persuasive regarding whether 
Ford is eligible to sue in the instant case as opposed to 
whether her suit has merit.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Title I. However, that decision was vacated by the granting of the 
plaintiff's petition for rehearing en banc. See 6th Cir. R. 14(a). The en 
banc decision did not address the Title I issue because it was not raised 
by the plaintiff's petition for rehearing en banc. See Parker v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1009 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998). 
 
2. The EEOC also argued in CNA that the disabled person was in the 
"employment position" of "disability benefit recipient." Id. at 1043 
(internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Seventh Circuit, the 
EEOC claimed that, "[b]ecause CNA imposes no job-related duties on any 
of the beneficiaries of its long-term disability plan, [the plaintiff] by 
definition can perform the essential functions of her position: there are 
none . . . ." Id. at 1043-44. The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument 
because, in its words, "[a]n `employment position' is a job[,]" id. at 
1044, 
meaning that receiving disability benefits did not qualify as an 
employment position. However, Ford does not offer this argument in the 
instant litigation. 
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We also disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in 
Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th 
Cir. 1996). In Gonzales, as in the instant case, a disabled 
former employee sued his former employer under the ADA 
regarding alleged discrimination in disability benefits. The 
Eleventh Circuit recognized the possible analogy between 
the Title VII retaliation context and the ADA situation, but 
it refused to adopt this analogy and to grant the plaintiff 
permission to sue. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit argued 
that, "[a]bsent clearly expressed legislative intent to the 
contrary, the plain language of the statute should be 
conclusive." Id. at 1528. The Eleventh Circuit concentrated 
on what it believed to be the plain meaning of the ADA, that 
only currently employable individuals could sue. However, 
it failed to address the possibility that the disparity between 
the rights created by the ADA and the apparent legal 
remedy fashioned by the ADA creates an ambiguity in the 
eligibility requirements for obtaining a remedy. 
 
In sum, we respectfully disagree with the district court 
and sister courts of appeals. We find that Title I of the ADA 
does permit disabled individuals to sue their former 
employers regarding their disability benefits. We reach this 
conclusion because the ADA's proscription of 
discrimination in fringe benefits generates the need for 
disabled individuals to have legal recourse against such 
discrimination and exposes the temporal ambiguity in the 
ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a disability[.]" 
We resolve this ambiguity in favor of a broad temporal 
interpretation of "qualified individual with a disability[,]" 
that disabled former employees, no longer able to work with 
or without reasonable accommodations, can sue their 
former employers concerning alleged discrimination in their 
package of disability benefits. Our impetus for this 
conclusion also comes from the Supreme Court's Robinson 
decision allowing former employees to sue under Title VII of 




Having established Ford's eligibility to sue under Title I, 
we must now ascertain whether she states a claim that 
survives the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ford 
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essentially claims that the disparity between benefits for 
mental and physical disabilities violates Title I of the ADA. 
However, Ford's argument does not support a finding of 
discrimination under Title I. 
 
While the defendants' insurance plan differentiated 
between types of disabilities, this is a far cry from a specific 
disabled employee facing differential treatment due to her 
disability. Every Schering employee had the opportunity to 
join the same plan with the same schedule of coverage, 
meaning that every Schering employee received equal 
treatment. So long as every employee is offered the same 
plan regardless of that employee's contemporary or future 
disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even 
if the plan offers different coverage for various disabilities. 
The ADA does not require equal coverage for every type of 
disability; such a requirement, if it existed, would 
destabilize the insurance industry in a manner definitely 
not intended by Congress when passing the ADA. 
 
This analysis is supported by Supreme Court and Third 
Circuit precedent concerning the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C. S 794 (1994), to which we may look for 
guidance in interpreting the ADA. See Gaul v. Lucent 
Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). In 
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985), 
plaintiffs sued in response to the Tennessee Medicaid 
program's reduction in the number of inpatient hospital 
days for which it would pay. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
reduction would have a disproportionate effect on 
handicapped individuals since they would require longer 
inpatient care than non-handicapped individuals. However, 
the Supreme Court held that the limit on inpatient hospital 
care was "neutral on its face[ ]" and did not "distinguish 
between those whose coverage will be reduced and those 
whose coverage will not on the basis of any test, judgment, 
or trait that the handicapped as a class are less capable of 
meeting or less likely of having." Id. at 302, 105 S. Ct. at 
720-21. According to the Supreme Court, handicapped 
citizens did not suffer from discrimination because both 
handicapped and non-handicapped individuals were 
"subject to the same durational limitation." Id. at 302, 105 
S. Ct. at 721. 
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Building on Alexander, the Supreme Court in Traynor v. 
Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988), dismissed 
a challenge to a federal statute precluding the Veterans 
Administration from granting extensions to a ten-year 
delimiting period for veterans to claim their benefits if the 
veterans' disabilities arose from their own willful 
misconduct, defined by regulations as including alcoholism. 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the statute 
discriminated against one type of disability, namely 
alcoholism. "There is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that 
requires that any benefit extended to one category of 
handicapped persons also be extended to all other 
categories of handicapped persons." Id. at 549, 108 S. Ct. 
at 1382. 
 
We have likewise held, in the context of the 
Rehabilitation Act, that a state's medical assistance statute 
need not treat every disability equally. In Doe v. Colautti, 
592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979), we dismissed a challenge to a 
Pennsylvania statute that provided unlimited 
hospitalization for physical illness in a private hospital but 
restricted hospitalization for mental illness in private 
mental hospitals. We rejected the argument that the 
differential level of benefits violated the Rehabilitation Act 
by noting that, "[i]n the treatment of their physical 
illnesses, the mentally ill receive the same benefits as 
everyone else. A mental patient with heart disease, for 
instance, is as entitled to benefits for treatment of the heart 
disease as would be a person not mentally ill." Id. at 708. 
Our holding in Doe is supported by the D.C. Circuit's 
decision in Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 772 (1997), in 
which the D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge brought by a 
former spouse of a foreign service officer against the 
Foreign Service Benefit Plan under the Rehabilitation Act 
based upon the plan's lower level of benefits for mental 
illness as compared to physical illness. 
 
Aside from Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent in 
the Rehabilitation Act context, claims under the ADA 
similar to Ford's have been rejected by three courts of 
appeals in published opinions. While we disagree with the 
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in CNA regarding the plaintiff's 
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eligibility to sue, we agree with its discussion regarding the 
merits of the plaintiff's claim. In rejecting the plaintiff's 
challenge to the disparity between benefits for mental and 
physical illnesses, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
 
       One of those terms, conditions, or privileges of 
       employment may be a pension plan, but there is no 
       claim here that CNA discriminated on the basis of 
       disability in offering its pension plan to anyone. It did 
       not charge higher prices to disabled people, on the 
       theory that they might require more in benefits. Nor 
       did it vary the terms of its plan depending on whether 
       or not the employee was disabled. All employees--the 
       perfectly healthy, the physically disabled, and the 
       mentally disabled--had a plan that promised them 
       long-term benefits from the onset of disability until age 
       65 if their problem was physical, and long-term 
       benefits for two years if the problem was mental or 
       nervous. . . . 
 
       [The plaintiff] raises a different kind of discrimination 
       claim, more grist for the ERISA mill or the national 
       health care debate than for the ADA. She claims that 
       the plan discriminates against employees who in the 
       future will become disabled due to mental conditions 
       rather than physical conditions; their present dollars 
       (unbeknownst to them) are buying only 24 months of 
       benefits, instead of benefits lasting much longer. 
       However this is dressed up, it is really a claim that 
       benefit plans themselves may not treat mental health 
       conditions less favorably than they treat physical 
       health conditions. Without far stronger language in the 
       ADA supporting this result, we are loath to read into it 
       a rule that has been the subject of vigorous, sometimes 
       contentious, national debate for the last several years. 
       Few, if any, mental health advocates have thought that 
       the result they would like to see has been there all 
       along in the ADA. 
 
CNA, 96 F.3d at 1044 (citations omitted). Likewise, in 
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 
1996), the Eighth Circuit rejected a challenge under the 
ADA to an insurance plan that denied coverage for 
infertility. Analogizing the infertility exclusion to differential 
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benefits for mental and physical illnesses, the Eighth 
Circuit stated, "Insurance distinctions that apply equally to 
all insured employees, that is, to individuals with 
disabilities and to those who are not disabled, do not 
discriminate on the basis of disability." Id. at 678. Finally, 
the Sixth Circuit in Parker rejected a claim similar to Ford's 
made against the same defendants as in the instant case. 
As the Sixth Circuit held, "Because all the employees at 
Schering-Plough, whether disabled or not, received the 
same access to the long-term disability plan, neither the 
defendants nor the plan discriminated between the disabled 
and the able bodied." 121 F.3d at 1015-16; cf . Brennen v. 
Comptroller of the State of N.Y., 100 F.3d 942, 1996 WL 
19057 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (benefits 
extended to one category of disabled persons need not be 
extended to all other categories). 
 
The cases finding no violation of the ADA by a disparity 
in benefits between mental and physical disabilities are 
supported by the ADA's legislative history. As the Senate 
Labor and Human Resources Committee report states: 
 
       In addition, employers may not deny health 
       insurance coverage completely to an individual based 
       on the person's diagnosis or disability. For example, 
       while it is permissible for an employer to offer 
       insurance policies that limit coverage for certain 
       procedures or treatments, e.g., only a specified amount 
       per year for mental health coverage, a person who has 
       a mental health condition may not be denied coverage 
       for other conditions such as for a broken leg or for 
       heart surgery because of the existence of the mental 
       health condition. A limitation may be placed on 
       reimbursements for a procedure or the types of drugs 
       or procedures covered[,] e.g., a limit on the number of 
       x-rays or non-coverage of experimental drugs or 
       procedures; but, that limitation must apply to persons 
       with or without disabilities. All people with disabilities 
       must have equal access to the health insurance 
       coverage that is provided by the employer to all 
       employees. 
 
S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 29 (1989). 
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In addition, legislative history subsequent to the ADA's 
passage evinces that Congress did not believe that the ADA 
mandated parity between mental and physical disability 
benefits. In 1996, the Senate defeated an amendment to the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified 
primarily in Titles 18, 26 and 42 of the U.S. Code), which 
would have mandated parity in insurance coverage for 
mental and physical illnesses. Such an amendment would 
have been unnecessary altogether if the ADA already 
required such parity. See 142 Cong. Rec. S9477-02 (daily 
ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Heflin); see also CNA, 
96 F.3d at 1044. Furthermore, Congress then passed the 
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, Title 
VII, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C.S 1185a 
and 42 U.S.C. S 300gg-5), which mandates, inter alia, that 
a health insurance plan containing no annual or lifetime 
limit for medical benefits cannot have such limits on 
mental health. Such congressional action reveals both that 
the ADA does not contain parity requirements and that no 
parity requirements for mental and physical disability 




Ford attempts to buttress her challenge to the disparity 
between benefits for mental and physical disabilities by 
pointing to section 501(c) of the ADA, which contains the 
"safe harbor" provision covering the insurance industry. 
This section, codified at 42 U.S.C. S 12201(c), reads as 
follows: 
 
       (c) Insurance 
 
       Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV 
       of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict 
       -- 
 
       (1) an insurer, hospital or medical service 
       company, health maintenance organization, or any 
       agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or 
       similar organizations from underwriting risks, 
       classifying risks, or administering such risks that 
       are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or 
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       (2) a person or organization covered by this 
       chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or 
       administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan 
       that are based on underwriting risks, classifying 
       risks, or administering such risks that are based 
       on or not inconsistent with State law; or 
 
       (3) a person or organization covered by this 
       chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or 
       administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan 
       that is not subject to State laws that regulate 
       insurance. 
 
       Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a 
       subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapter [sic] I 
       and III of this chapter. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12201(c). Ford essentially claims that, once she 
presents a prima facie case alleging discrimination in 
disability benefits, Schering and MetLife must present 
actuarial data demonstrating that their plan is not a 
"subterfuge[.]" Hence, according to Ford, the district court 
erred in granting the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion since 
the defendants had not offered data justifying the actuarial 
basis for the disparity in benefits. 
 
Ford's argument must fail, however, since it runs 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, ignores our statutory 
duty regarding insurance regulation and distorts the role of 
this court. First, Ford's argument that Schering and MetLife 
must justify their insurance plan contradicts the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of a provision similar to section 
501(c) in the context of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 
(1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. S 621 et  seq. (1994)). Prior to 
Congress's elimination of the term "subterfuge" from the 
ADEA in 1990, see Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, the ADEA 
granted an exemption from the ADEA's prohibition of age 
discrimination to an employee benefit plan that was not "a 
subterfuge[.]" 29 U.S.C. S 623(f) (1988). In Public Employees 
Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 109 S. Ct. 
2854 (1989), the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to an 
insurance plan that rendered covered employees ineligible 
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for disability retirement once they reached age sixty. 
Relying on its decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 
434 U.S. 192, 98 S. Ct. 444 (1977), the Supreme Court 
concluded that the term "subterfuge" must be given its 
ordinary meaning of " `a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice 
of evasion.' " Betts, 492 U.S. at 167, 109 S. Ct. at 2861 
(quoting McMann, 434 U.S. at 203, 98 S. Ct. at 450). In 
addition, the Supreme Court found that requiring an 
insurance company to justify its coverage scheme had no 
basis in the statutory language. See id. at 170-71, 109 S. 
Ct. at 2863; see also McMann, 434 U.S. at 203, 98 S. Ct. 
at 450. 
 
The Supreme Court's definition and analysis of the 
ADEA's use of the term "subterfuge" are applicable to the 
ADA's use of the term "subterfuge[.]" Congress enacted 
section 501(c) of the ADA in 1990, see Pub. L. No. 101-336, 
104 Stat. 369 (1990), while the Supreme Court decided 
Betts in 1989. Congress therefore is presumed to have 
adopted the Supreme Court's interpretation of "subterfuge" 
in the ADEA context when Congress enacted the ADA. 
"[W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating 
sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed 
to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the 
incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new 
statute." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581, 98 S. Ct. 866, 
870 (1978); see Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 
221 U.S. 1, 59, 31 S. Ct. 502, 515 (1911) ("[W]here words 
are employed in a statute which had at the time a well- 
known meaning at common law or in the law of this 
country, they are presumed to have been used in that 
sense unless the context compels to the contrary."). "Had 
Congress intended to reject the Betts interpretation of 
subterfuge when it enacted the ADA, it could have done so 
expressly by incorporating language for that purpose into 
the bill that Congress voted on and the President signed." 
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679; accord Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1064. 
Accordingly, as the Supreme Court held in the ADEA 
context, the term "subterfuge" does not require an 
insurance company to justify its policy coverage after a 
plaintiff's mere prima facie allegation. 
 
The second reason that Ford's argument must fail is that 
it ignores our statutory duty under the McCarran-Ferguson 
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Act regarding insurance cases. Pursuant to that Act, "No 
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or 
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act 
specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . ." 15 
U.S.C. S 1012(b) (1994). The ADA does not "specifically 
relate[ ] to the business of insurance[,]" id., and does not 
mention the term "insurance" in its introductory section 
entitled "Findings and purpose[.]" See 42 U.S.C. S 12101. 
Accordingly, we will not construe section 501(c) to require 
a seismic shift in the insurance business, namely requiring 
insurers to justify their coverage plans in court after a mere 
allegation by a plaintiff. This second reason is integrally 
related to the third reason Ford's argument regarding 
section 501(c) fails, namely that requiring insurers to justify 
their coverage plans elevates this court to the position of 
super-actuary. This court is clearly not equipped to become 
the watchdog of the insurance business, and it is unclear 
exactly what actuarial analysis the defendants would have 
to produce to disprove the charge of "subterfuge[.]" See 
Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1062-63 (noting confusion as to 




Ford's second claim against Schering and MetLife is that 
the disparity in benefits for mental and physical disabilities 
violates Title III of the ADA. Title III reads in relevant part 
as follows: "No individual shall be discriminated against on 
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by 
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a 
place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. S 12182(a). 
Relying on the principle that courts should avoid 
interpreting statutes in a manner rendering some words 
redundant, see United States v. Alaska, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 
117 S. Ct. 1888, 1918 (1997), Ford and the U.S. Dept. of 
Justice as amicus essentially argue that the phrase 
"services, . . . privileges, [and] advantages" covers 
discrimination in realms different than physical access to 
facilities or else these words would be superfluous. Ford 
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can also cite to the ADA itself for the proposition that an 
"insurance office[ ]" is a public accommodation under Title 
III. 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7)(F) (listing examples of public 
accommodations including "insurance office[]"). 
 
The fact that an insurance office is a public 
accommodation, however, does not mean that the 
insurance policies offered at that location are covered by 
Title III. In the instant case, Schering and MetLife offered 
disability benefits to Ford in the context of her employment 
at Schering, meaning that the disability benefits constituted 
part of the terms and conditions of Ford's employment. 
Terms and conditions of employment are covered under 
Title I, not Title III. "Title III is not intended to govern any 
terms or conditions of employment by providers of public 
accommodations or potential places of employment; 
employment practices are governed by title I of this 
legislation." S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 58 (1989); see H.R. 
Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 382. Therefore, Ford cannot state a claim 
against her employer, Schering, pursuant to Title III. 
See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1015. 
 
Regarding MetLife, the disability benefits that Ford 
challenges do not qualify as a public accommodation and 
thus do not fall within the rubric of Title III. The plain 
meaning of Title III is that a public accommodation is a 
place, leading to the conclusion that " `[i]t is all of the 
services which the public accommodation offers, not all 
services which the lessor of the public accommodation 
offers[,] which fall within the scope of Title III.' " Id. at 1011 
(quoting Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc., 
59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995) (a television broadcast is 
not covered by Title III)). This is in keeping with the host of 
examples of public accommodations provided by the ADA, 
all of which refer to places. See 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7).3 Since 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 12181(7) reads as follows: 
 
The following private entities are considered public accommodations 
for purposes of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect 
commerce-- 
 
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an 
establishment located within a building that contains not more than five 
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Ford received her disability benefits via her employment at 
Schering, she had no nexus to MetLife's "insurance office" 
and thus was not discriminated against in connection with 
a public accommodation. Furthermore, the "goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations" 
concerning which a disabled person cannot suffer 
discrimination are not free-standing concepts but rather all 
refer to the statutory term "public accommodation" and 
thus to what these places of public accommodation provide. 
Ford cannot point to these terms as providing protection 
from discrimination unrelated to places. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of 
such establishment as the residence of such proprietor; 
 
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; 
 
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other 
place of exhibition or entertainment; 
 
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of 
public gathering; 
 
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping 
center, or other sales or rental establishment; 
 
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel 
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an 
accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of 
a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment; 
 
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public 
transportation; 
 
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or 
collection; 
 
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; 
 
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate 
private school, or other place of education; 
 
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food 
bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and 
 
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place 
of exercise or recreation. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12181(7). 
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Restricting "public accommodation" to places is in 
keeping with jurisprudence concerning Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000a (1994). Title II 
proscribes racial and religious discrimination in"the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation 
. . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 2000a(a). This proscription has been 
limited to places rather than including membership in an 
organization, see Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 
1267, 1269-75 (7th Cir. 1993), and rather than 
encompassing an organization's operations unconnected to 
any physical facility. See Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 
18 F.3d 752, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
Confining "public accommodation" to places is also in 
keeping with the Dept. of Justice's regulations to this effect: 
 
       The purpose of the ADA's public accommodations 
       requirements is to ensure accessibility to the goods 
       offered by a public accommodation, not to alter the 
       nature or mix of goods that the public accommodation 
       has typically provided. In other words, a bookstore, for 
       example, must make its facilities and sales operations 
       accessible to individuals with disabilities, but is not 
       required to stock Brailled or large print books. 
       Similarly, a video store must make its facilities and 
       rental operations accessible, but is not required to 
       stock closed-captioned video tapes. 
 
28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 640 (1997). Just as a bookstore 
must be accessible to the disabled but need not treat the 
disabled equally in terms of books the store stocks, likewise 
an insurance office must be physically accessible to the 
disabled but need not provide insurance that treats the 
disabled equally with the non-disabled. While the Dept. of 
Justice has issued other documents stating that Title III 
does cover the substance of insurance contracts, see Dept. 
of Justice, Title III Technical Assistance Manual: Covering 
Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities S III- 
3.11000, at 19 (Nov. 1993) ("Insurance offices are places of 
public accommodation and, as such, may not discriminate 
on the basis of disability in the sale of insurance contracts 
or in the terms or conditions of the insurance contracts 
they offer."), such an interpretation is "manifestly contrary" 
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to the plain meaning of Title III and, accordingly, is not 
binding on this court. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S. Ct. 
2778, 2782 (1984); see Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012 n.5. 
Furthermore, since we find the plain meaning of "public 
accommodation" and 42 U.S.C. S 12182(a) to be clear, we 
have no need to analyze the ADA's legislative history. 
 
We also note that, by aligning ourselves with the Sixth 
Circuit's Parker decision regarding the definition of "public 
accommodation[,]" we part company with the First Circuit 
in this regard. In Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. 
Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994), the First Circuit held that Title III 
is not limited to physical structures. The First Circuit 
pointed to the inclusion of "travel service" in the list of 
public accommodations and noted: 
 
       Many travel services conduct business by telephone or 
       correspondence without requiring their customers to 
       enter an office in order to obtain their services. 
       Likewise, one can easily imagine the existence of other 
       service establishments conducting business by mail 
       and phone without providing facilities for their 
       customers to enter in order to utilize their services. It 
       would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter 
       an office to purchase services are protected by the 
       ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over 
       the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not 
       have intended such an absurd result. 
 
Id. at 19 (citing 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7)(F)). However, as the 
Sixth Circuit pointed out in Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014, the 
First Circuit failed to read the examples of public 
accommodations that piqued the First Circuit's interest in 
the context of the other examples of public 
accommodations. The litany of terms, including 
"auditorium," "bakery," "laundromat," "museum," "park," 
"nursery," "food bank," and "gymnasium[ ]" refer to places 
with resources utilized by physical access. 42 U.S.C. 
S 12181(7)(D)-(F), (H)-(L). Pursuant to the doctrine of 
noscitur a sociis, the terms that the First Circuit finds 
ambiguous should be interpreted by reference to the 
accompanying words of the statute "to avoid the giving of 
 
                                24 
  
unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress." Jarecki v. 
G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S. Ct. 1579, 1582 
(1961). Accordingly, we do not find the term "public 
accommodation" or the terms in 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7) to 
refer to non-physical access or even to be ambiguous as to 
their meaning. 
 
In sum, Ford fails to state a claim under Title III of the 
ADA since the provision of disability benefits by MetLife to 





For the above reasons, we will affirm the September 12, 
1996, order of the district court dismissing Ford's 
complaint for failure to state a claim. Unlike the district 
court, we find that Ford is eligible to sue under Title I. 
However, Ford fails to state a claim under Titles I or III and 
errs in asserting that the "safe harbor" provision of Title V 
requires insurance companies to justify their coverage 
plans after a plaintiff's prima facie allegation. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: 
 
I agree with the majority that Ford fails to state a claim 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). However, 
I reach this conclusion based solely on the insurance "safe 
harbor" provision located in section 501(c) of the ADA. See 
42 U.S.C. S 12201(c). 
 
Section 501(c) provides that Titles I and III of the ADA 
"shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict" the terms of 
a bona fide insurance plan. 42 U.S.C. S 12201(c). This 
exemption applies so long as it is not "used as a subterfuge 
to evade the purposes of" the ADA. Id. As the majority 
recognizes, the term "subterfuge" must be construed in 
accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Public 
Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 
(1989). See Maj. Op. at 18-19. Betts concerned a "safe 
harbor" provision that exempted fringe benefit plans from 
coverage by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA). See 29 U.S.C. S 623(f)(2) (1988).1 Like section 
501(c), the ADEA exemption provided that it would not 
protect a plan that was "a subterfuge to evade the purposes 
of" the Act. Id. In interpreting this language, the Court 
concluded that an employee benefit plan adopted prior to 
the enactment of the ADEA could not be considered a 
subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA. Betts, 492 
U.S. at 166-69 (reaffirming the holding of United Air Lines, 
Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977)). Under the same 
reasoning, the insurance plan challenged by Ford cannot be 
considered a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA 
since the plan was adopted prior to the enactment of the 
ADA.2 See Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1063-1065 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Following Betts, section 623(f)(2) was amended by the Older Workers 
Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, S 103(1), 104 Stat. 
978. 
 
2. The disputed portions of the plan have been in effect since at least 
1985. App. at 69, 87. The ADA was enacted in 1990. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 12101. 
 
Three justices in McMann rejected the majority's conclusion that a 
plan adopted prior to the enactment of the ADEA could not be a 
subterfuge to avoid the purposes of that Act. See 434 U.S. at 204-05 
(White, J., concurring); id. at 219 n.13 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, 
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(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that an insurance plan enacted 
prior to the importation of ADA standards into the 
Rehabilitation Act could not be considered a subterfuge to 
evade those standards). Accordingly, the defendants' plan is 
insulated from attack by section 501(c). 
 
I further note that Ford's complaint as currently framed 
fails to allege that the defendants ever developed a"specific 
intent" to evade the purposes of the ADA. See Betts, 492 
U.S. at 171. In Betts, the Court wrote: 
 
       [W]hen an employee seeks to challenge a benefit plan 
       provision as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the 
       Act, the employee bears the burden of proving that the 
       discriminatory plan provision actually was intended to 
       serve the purpose of discriminating in some non-fringe- 
       benefit aspect of the employment relation. 
 
Betts, 492 U.S. at 181. Under this reading of "subterfuge," 
Ford could not successfully challenge the defendants' 
insurance plan unless she could show that it was intended 
to serve the purpose of discriminating in some non- 
insurance-benefit aspect of her relationship with the 
defendants. Ford's complaint contains no such allegation of 
intent. 
 
Given the effect of section 501(c) on Ford's claims, I do 
not think that it is necessary for the court to conclude that 
distinguishing between people with different disabilities for 
insurance purposes is not discrimination based on 
disability. See Maj. Op. at 12-13. In fact, it would seem that 
making such distinctions does constitute discrimination in 
the most basic sense of the word. See Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary at 648 (defining discrimination as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
J., dissenting). According to these justices, a pre-Act plan could become 
a subterfuge if it was maintained after the passage of the ADEA in order 
to evade the purposes of that Act. One could argue that this position is 
stronger under the ADA's "safe harbor" provision due to difference in the 
statutory language. Compare 29 U.S.C. S 623(f) ("is not a subterfuge to 
evade the purposes of" the ADEA) (emphasis added) with 42 U.S.C. 
S 1201(c) ("shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of" 
the ADA) (emphasis added). However, I do not believe that this change is 
sufficient to avoid the mandate of McMann and Betts. 
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"the making or perceiving of a distinction or difference"). 
However, we need not wrestle with the question of what 
might or might not constitute unlawful insurance 
discrimination under the ADA had Congress not addressed 
the issue; Congress did address the issue and provided an 
explicit answer in section 501(c). 
 
In light of the ease with which Ford's claims can be 
resolved under section 501(c), I would not reach the more 
difficult issues of: 1) whether a former employee who can 
no longer work can meet Title I's "qualified individual with 
a disability" requirement; and 2) whether Title III's public 
accommodation provision guarantees anything more than 
physical access. These issues have divided the circuits, and 
I would reserve judgment until we are confronted with a 
case in which the unique considerations of insurance plans 
are not at stake. 
 
A True Copy: 
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